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“EVERYBODY KNOWS WHAT  
A PICKET LINE MEANS”: 
Picketing before the British Columbia  
Court of Appeal
Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker
In 1951, it was obvious to Justice Cornelius O’Halloran, one of the most outspoken members of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (bcca), that picketing was unlawful. According to him, 
“in a unionized city like Vancouver everybody knows what a picket line 
means. Many neutral individuals are afraid of patronizing places where 
labour picketers none too subtly convey by their organized and militant 
presence and patrol the unspoken threat ‘you better not patronize this 
place.’”1 O’Halloran’s statement was made in a judgment that held that 
two trade unionists who paraded peacefully in front of a restaurant with 
signs that stated that the restaurant did not have collective agreements 
with the union were acting illegally.2 His equation of picketing with 
coercion was not idiosyncratic. In its first one hundred years, despite 
several changes in the legal regime governing labour relations in the 
province and numerous changes in court membership, unions won only 
eight out of the thirty-eight decisions on the legality of picketing and 
obtained partial victories in another two (See Table 1 for a numerical 
breakdown and Appendix 1 for a complete list of cases).3 However, the 
one-sided results obscure the extent of the debate within the bcca, 
especially in its early years, over whether there was any room at all for 
 1 Aristocratic Restaurants (1947) Ltd. v. Williams et al., [1951] 1 D.L.R. 360, 368. 
 2 For more detailed discussion of the case and the holding, see below.
 3 We have not examined the record of the British Columbia Supreme Court, which heard 
injunction applications in the first instance. However, we suspect it was similarly hostile to 
labour picketing based on the fact that unions were the appellants in twenty-eight of the thirty-
eight decisions to reach the bcca. In identifying the universe of picketing cases decided by the 
bcca, we have focused on the activity of picketing and consumer leafleting to the exclusion of 
boycott (hot) declarations and other forms of industrial action. We have also excluded purely 
technical and procedural cases that deal with questions of evidence and contempt cases that 
address whether union leaders and picketers complied with injunctions previously issued 
by the court. All of the cases were located by conducting Quicklaw searches and following 
up on cases cited within those cases. No archival searches were conducted. Arsens, the one 
unreported case we have, was referred to in one of the reported cases.
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lawful picketing as well as over the greater success achieved by unions 
in cases heard in the post-Charter era.  
 This article documents the one-sidedness of the bcca’s picketing 
jurisprudence, highlights the legal reasons given by the judges to 
support their conclusions, and examines the extent of disagreement 
over picketing within the court. We have grouped the bcca’s picketing 
decisions into five periods, with each period representing a different 
mix of how collective bargaining and picketing were regulated. The first 
period, from 1908 to 1948, was marked by a combination of common law 
and ineffective statutory immunities. In the second period, from the 
passage of statutory collective bargaining in 1947 to the Trade Union Act 
in 1959, the court used breaches of labour statutes to perfect common law 
causes of action. In the middle period, which lasted through the 1960s 
until the early 1970s, the court interpreted the statutory code of picketing 
contained in the 1959 legislation very narrowly. With the introduction 
of the Labour Code, in 1973, which sought to severely limit the courts’ 
regulation of picketing, the bcca whittled away at the labour board’s 
authority over picketing. Since 1982, the court has refused every attempt 
to use the Charter’s guarantee of fundamental rights to create a protected 
space for picketing, but it has become more willing to accept the labour 
board’s jurisdiction over picketing and to tolerate peaceful picketing in 
cases that do not involve the Constitution. In the conclusion, we suggest 
some possible explanations for the bcca’s consistent hostility towards 
picketing. 
Table 1 
bcca Picketing Cases, 1908-2008
1908-48 1949-58 1959-73 1973-82 1982-2008 Total
Employer wins 4 4 8 5 7 28
Union wins 0 1 2 0 5 8
Split 0 0 0 2 0 2
Total 4 5 10 7 12 38
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IN THE BEGINNING
Between 1908 and 1948, picketing was governed by a messy amalgam 
of common law, civil statute, and criminal law. Its legality could be 
challenged most effectively through injunctions or the Criminal Code. 
An injunction is a particularly effective means of stopping picketing 
since it is a judicial order to stop specified conduct, the breach of which 
amounts to contempt of court. Between 1908 and 1948, there were three 
cases that reached the bcca, and each involved peaceful picketing in 
front of a movie theatre, although the issues in dispute and the causes of 
action differed. These cases led to a great deal of judicial disagreement. 
However, the result in each was the same; the court upheld the re-
strictions on picketing. 
 The Schuberg case arose out of a strike in 1926 by unionized projec-
tionists against the Empress Theatre in Vancouver after it laid off two 
union members. The striking workers distributed handbills to patrons, 
stating that the theatre was unfair to organized labour, while trade union 
members drove automobiles back and forth in front of the theatre with 
banners declaring the same. The employer obtained an injunction and 
the union appealed.4 The fundamental question before the bcca was 
whether workers enjoyed a common law privilege to peacefully picket 
their employer in order to advance their collective interests and, if not, 
to what extent the 1902 BC Trades-Union Act 5 (tua) provided statutory 
immunity from the common law. 
 The panel of four judges hearing the case split evenly. Chief Justice 
James Alexander Macdonald and Justice Albert McPhillips were of 
the view that the picketing was unlawful at common law, although 
they had different reasons for their shared finding.6 They also narrowly 
interpreted the scope of the immunity granted by British Columbia’s 
1902 statute. Section 2 of the tua provided that trade unions were not 
subject to injunctions or liable for communicating facts or persuading 
 4 Schuberg v. Local Internat. Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees et al., [1926] 3 D.L.R. 166. Mary 
F. Southin discussed this case in an article published in the Vancouver Bar Association’s 
magazine, The Advocate, before she joined the bcca in 1988. See Mary F. Southin, “The Courts 
and Labour Injunctions,” The Advocate 28 (1970): 74-84. In practice, Southin represented the 
Plumbers’ Union in their successful appeal of the Becker case, discussed below. She was the 
first woman elected as a bencher (in 1971) and was widely known as an outspoken judge who 
issued a series of controversial decisions in a range of cases. We thank Hamar Foster for 
bringing this article to our attention. 
 5 S.B.C. 1902, c. 66. A.W.R. Carrothers, “A Legislative History of the BC Trade-Unions Act: 
The Rossland Miners’ Case,” UBC Legal Notes 2, 4 (1956): 339-46. British Columbia was the 
only province that provided some statutory immunity to trade unionists from common law 
liability. As we shall see, however, its scope was narrowly interpreted by judges.
 6 Schuberg v. Local Internat. Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees et al., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 20 at 21.
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by fair or reasonable argument, while s. 3 granted similar immunity 
for publishing information about the strike or urging persons not to 
purchase or consume the struck employer’s products. In the judges’ 
view, the statute did not provide immunity for civil conspiracies to injure 
trade and, moreover, the picketing in this case was not communicating 
facts, persuading by argument, or publishing information but, rather, 
expressing a conclusion.7
 In contrast, Justices Archer Martin and Malcolm Archibald Mac-
donald took a much broader view of both the common law privilege to 
picket and the scope of statutory immunity granted. With respect to the 
protected communication under the tua, both held that the expression 
“unfair to labour” was permissible and that s. 3 clearly permitted a union 
to urge members of the public not to patronize an employer.8 However, 
because of the equal division, the judgment of the lower court stood.9 
 The sharply contrasting views of the judges in Schuberg were re-
played in the bcca’s two other picketing judgments during this period. 
Rex v. Richards & Woolridge involved an appeal from a conviction for 
criminal watching and besetting for picketing in front of the Edison 
Theatre in New Westminster. The same panel of judges that decided 
Schuberg heard this appeal, and again it split evenly over the issue. 
The question was whether the watching and besetting provision in 
the Criminal Code made all picketing, including peaceful picketing, 
criminal.10 The stipulation in the Code that the section applied to persons 
who watched and beset “wrongfully and without lawful authority” 
seemed to make no difference to Chief Justice Macdonald or Justice 
McPhillips.11 McPhillips took it as accepted law that picketing of all 
kinds wrongfully interfered with the right to do business. The picketing 
here, therefore, was wrongful and so the watching and besetting was 
criminal.12 
 Once again, Justices Martin and M.A. Macdonald dissented. Martin 
was of the view that the activity in question clearly came within the 
sphere of activity protected by the tua and, therefore, that the union 
 7 Ibid. at 22, 31. McPhillips did not deal with the part of s. 3 that permits trade unionists to 
urge persons not to purchase the employer’s products. 
 8 Ibid. at 22-29, 38-41.
 9 For a critique of the judgment, see Bora Laskin, “Picketing: A Comparison of Certain 
Canadian and American Doctrines,” Canadian Bar Review 15 (1937): 10 at 16, 19. The resolution 
of the dispute is unknown, but whatever it was, it did not deter the Communist Party from 
subsequently holding the Lenin Memorial Concert at the Empress Theatre on 21 January 
1937 (Glenbow Museum, Image No. NA-3634-16).
 10 Rex v. Richards & Woolridge, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 332. 
 11 Ibid. at 334.
 12 Ibid. at 340-45. 
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had lawful authority to watch and beset; Macdonald held that, without 
wrongful behaviour, such as creating a nuisance or engaging in violence 
or intimidation, watching and besetting was not criminal. Thus, the 
peaceful picketing that occurred here was clearly permitted.13 Again, 
an equal split allowed the conviction to stand. 
 The third case involved a dispute that arose when the owner of the 
Hollywood Theatre in Vancouver fired the one unionized projectionist 
on staff in order to hire his own son, who was not a union member, 
allegedly in violation of the agreement he signed with the union.14 
Initially, the picketing was confined to two people carrying signs to the 
effect that the theatre did not employ union projectionists. However, 
a larger solidarity picket involving some sixty to seventy people was 
organized by the district labour council, and the theatre was also placed 
on a “we do not patronize” list. An interim (temporary) injunction was 
issued and upheld by a unanimous bcca.15 
 The case went to trial and the trial judge awarded a permanent 
injunction and damages. On appeal, Martin, who was now the chief 
justice, would have allowed the initial picketing on the basis of his 
earlier reading of the tua but, for reasons not stated, found that the 
mass picketing was unprotected by statute.16 However, the two more 
recently appointed justices, William McQuarrie and O’Halloran, perhaps 
offended by the union’s interference with the “natural” desire of a father 
to train his son to enter the family business, hewed to a much tougher 
line, and they found all of the picketing to be wrongful. 
 Justice O’Halloran’s decision merits consideration as one of the 
most anti-union judgments written at the appellate level in Canadian 
history. He declared: “[T]he term ‘peaceful picketing’ has no place in 
the law of this Province. It is a negation in terms … Without intimi-
dation, obstruction and moral coercion [picketing] was useless for the 
purposes employed; with them it was provocative.”17 He concluded that 
the picketing received no protection from the Trade Union Act: “By no 
straining of the language may such terms as ‘communicating,’ ‘per-
suading,’ ‘recommending,’ ‘advising,’ ‘warning,’ and ‘urging’ be extended 
to include marching backwards and forward in an organized manner in 
 13 Ibid. at 334-40, 345-47.
 14 At the time of writing the Hollywood Theatre was still in operation. At the top of its web 
page it proudly states: “FAMILY OWNED & OPERATED FOR 73 YEARS,” http://
www.hollywoodtheatre.ca (viewed 20 May 2009).
 15 Hollywood Theatres Ltd. v. Tenney et al., [1939] 2 D.L.R. 745. (Hollywood Theatres (1)). See 
Southin’s discussion of this case, supra note 4, 77.
 16 Hollywood Theatres v. Tenney, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 452. (Hollywood Theatres (2)).
 17 Ibid. at 459.
bc studies58
front of the employer’s premises, let alone include the organized mass 
demonstration of June 11.”18 By taking action to enforce its interpretation 
of the contract, O’Halloran claimed that the union sought to “override 
the ‘rule of law’ … Any attempt to place labour or business controversies 
outside of organized society and refuse to subject them to social controls is 
repugnant equally to our common law and our statute law.”19 The irony is 
that the union had to resort to self-help to enforce its collective agreement 
because English and Canadian courts had previously ruled that collective 
agreements could not be enforced in courts. Moreover, O’Halloran failed 
to acknowledge that the employer had engaged in self-help; instead of 
taking the dispute over the closed shop in the collective agreement to 
court, the employer simply fired the unionized worker over the union’s 
objection that this was a breach of their agreement.20 
 It is striking that all the picketing cases that reached the bcca during 
this period arose in the context of disputes between movie projectionists 
and theatre owners. This was hardly the work setting most prone to 
violent labour confrontations, which were far more common in the 
primary resource sector, on the waterfront, and with the unemployed. 
However, in those contexts injunctions were not the legal instrument 
of choice; rather, employers relied on the police and the criminal law 
to control disruptive worker collective action.21 Picketing in front of 
theatres in urban locations may have seemed particularly problematic to 
judges because it targeted consumers as much as owners and, therefore, 
may have been seen as adversely affecting the rights of “innocent” third 
parties.22 Moreover, movie-going was connected with the growth of mass 
consumption in the twentieth century, which itself required the creation 
of common orderly spaces where middle-class patrons could safely mix 
with working-class viewers.23
 18 Ibid. at 464. 
 19 Ibid. at 471.
 20 See also Bora Laskin, “Labour Law: 1923-1947,” Canadian Bar Review 26 (1948): 286, 295-96 
(referring to O’Halloran’s judgment as a “complete emasculation” of the tua).
 21 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 
1900-66 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, Study 22 1968) 202-06, 227-70; Judy Fudge 
and Eric Tucker, Labour before the Law (Oxford: Toronto, 2001) 153-262.
 22 In that regard, it is interesting to speculate about the relation between O’Halloran’s hostility 
towards consumer picketing and his dissent, less than one year later in Rogers v. Clarence 
Hotel Ltd, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 583, in which he would have allowed a Black man to sue a hotel for 
refusing to serve him on the basis of his race. Perhaps it was a belief that the common law 
ought to protect the freedom of the individual consumer that connected these positions. For 
a discussion of the Rogers case and O’Halloran’s dissent, see James W. St. G. Walker, “Race,” 
Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1997) 174-76.
 23 Paul S. Moore, “Movie Palaces on Canadian Downtown Main Streets: Montreal, Toronto, 
and Vancouver,” Urban History Review 32, 2 (2004): 3.
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 In any event, notwithstanding significant dissent, by the end of the 
Second World War the bcca had distinguished itself by having one of 
the most restrictive views of picketing in Canada, despite the fact that 
British Columbia was the only province with legislation granting trade 
unions a modicum of immunity from civil liability. The tua had been 
“reduced to impotence by courts whose fixed idea about the nature of 
legitimate business conflict allowed little sympathy for effective trade 
union activity.”24
COMMON LAW CONTROLS IN A STATUTORY  
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING REGIME 1947-58
Along with the other provinces, British Columbia enacted a statutory 
collective bargaining scheme after the Second World War. The 1947 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (icaa) provided unions with 
protection against unfair employer practices and gave them the right to 
become certified as the bargaining agent of a defined group of workers if 
the union could demonstrate majority support. It also imposed controls 
on the right to engage in industrial action by prohibiting strikes during 
the life of the collective agreement and requiring the parties to undergo 
conciliation before resorting to strikes or lockouts. The legal regulation 
of picketing, however, remained a matter for the courts. In this period 
the courts continued to address the scope for picketing permitted under 
the criminal and common law and the scope of immunity granted by 
the Trade Union Act. But now they also had to deal with the implications 
of the icaa for the law of picketing.
 The second case to reach the bcca under the new regime was 
Aristocratic Restaurants.25 The employer operated a chain of restaurants, 
but the union had only succeeded in organizing and becoming certified 
under the icaa as bargaining agent for the employees at one of the 
plaintiff’s restaurants. The union had been unable to negotiate a collective 
agreement for that restaurant, and the employees there quit the union. 
 24 I.M. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University 
Industrial Relations Centre, 1967) 55. For another lengthy parsing of the tua 1906 and the 
court’s interpretation, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The Right to Picket in British Columbia: 
A Study in Statutory Interpretation,” University of Toronto Law Journal 9 (1951): 250, 263-75.
 25 [1951] 1 D.L.R. 360. The first case, Arsens v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 459, 
was unreported and no written decision has been located. However, there is an entry in the 
order book, dated 14 June 1950, reversing the decision of Wood, J., who had dissolved the 
interlocutory injunction issued by Macfarlane, J. The bcca panel consisted of O’Halloran, 
Robertson, and Bird. See British Columbia Archives (bca), GR-1572, vol. 16, no. 2. See also 
Southin’s discussion of this case, supra note 4 at 78. 
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Despite its lack of members, the union remained the certified bargaining 
agent for the employees at the restaurant it had organized. In an attempt 
to get a collective agreement for that restaurant, it hired picketers, who, 
two at a time, paraded peacefully in front of the restaurant for which 
it had bargaining rights as well as in front of the employer’s other res-
taurants, for which it did not have bargaining rights. The picket signs 
stated the fact that these restaurants did not have union agreements. At 
trial, Justice John Owen Wilson held that, while it would be unlawful 
intimidation to accost prospective patrons and warn them that “this is 
a picket line” or to obstruct the entrance to the restaurant, there was 
nothing unlawful about what the picketers had done in this case, which 
was silently to hold up signs that made truthful statements, even if that 
caused damage to the employer.26 
 Once again, the three justices who heard the employer’s appeal 
disagreed on the result, although the majority, consisting of Justices 
O’Halloran and Sidney Smith, allowed the appeal.27 O’Halloran wrote 
another lengthy judgment dealing with the legality of picketing under 
the pre-existing law as well as with the effect of the icaa. He was clearly 
not pleased with Wilson’s attempt to treat some parts of his judgment in 
Hollywood Theatres as non-binding (obiter).28 In his view, all picketing was 
wrongful even if conducted in silence. O’Halloran supported his claim 
with the comments quoted in the opening paragraph of this article.
 O’Halloran also addressed the question of whether labour picketing 
was permissible other than when the prerequisites for a lawful strike had 
been fulfilled. He was firmly of the view that it was not; the icaa was to 
be read as a complete code that gave unions certain rights in exchange 
for a restriction on the privilege to resort to economic pressure until the 
machinery of conciliation had been exhausted. As a result, picketing that 
occurred without strict compliance with the requirements of the icaa 
 26 [1950] 4 D.L.R. 548. Wilson was a small-town lawyer prior to his first judicial appointment 
to the Cariboo County Bench in the 1930s. According to John Stanton, a union-side lawyer, 
Wilson was a well respected member of the establishment, but his practical experience in the 
North and his common sense informed his judgments. See John Stanton, Never Say Die! The 
Life and Times of a Pioneer Labour Lawyer (Ottawa: Steel Rail Publishing, 1987) 112. In a 1979 
interview, Justice Wilson stated that he was involved in labour disputes as a conciliator early 
in his career and that as a young practicing lawyer in Prince George he felt very sorry for the 
workmen, because they were getting the worst of it. However, he also went on to say that he no 
longer felt that way at the time of the interview. See Transcript of Interview with the Honourable 
J.O. Wilson (Aural History Programme, British Columbia Legal History Collection Project, 
Faculty of Law , University of British Columbia, June/September 1979), 28-29. 
 27 Supra note 25 at 374-81. Justice Robertson disagreed with the view that a strike that violated 
the icaa lost the immunities granted by the tua. Moreover, he held that picketing was not 
per se tortious or criminal.
 28 Ibid. at 366. 
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for a lawful strike was itself unlawful.29 
 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (scc), the first 
bcca picketing case to come before that court. A majority of the scc 
allowed the appeal, Charles H. Locke J. and Thibaudeau Rinfret C.J.C. 
dissenting.30 The multiplicity of judgments that created the majority make 
it difficult to state a clear holding, but the important points of agreement 
were that peaceful picketing was neither criminal watching and besetting 
nor per se tortious. Moreover, the failure to comply with the requirements 
of the icaa was not relevant to the legality of the picketing. For the first 
time, the scc clearly affirmed the legality of peaceful picketing. But the 
limits of the judgment, and especially of the courts’ commitment to it, 
soon became apparent, and the BC courts played a leading role in the 
process of eroding its impact.31 
 The first bcca judgment on picketing after Aristocratic was Hammer 
v. Kemmis et al.32 The case arose out of an organizing drive at a small 
bakery. The employer terminated two bakery employees, and the union 
picketed with the aim of pressuring the employer to sign the standard 
agreement it had with other wholesale bakeries. The bakery obtained an 
injunction, and the union appealed. Justice Frederik Sheppard, writing 
for himself and Henry Bird, denied the appeal.33 Once again, however, 
the bcca was split as Justice Herbert William Davey dissented. The 
majority upheld the trial judge’s finding that the object of the union 
was not to advance its own interests but, rather, to punish the bakery 
for dismissing the two employees and not signing its agreement. As 
well, the means used were unlawful since the pickets “accosted intended 
customers, stared in their faces so as to cause the customers to become 
frightened and leave without entering the store,” a finding based entirely 
on affidavit evidence (which is not subject to cross-examination by the 
 29 Ibid. at 368-74. This aspect of the judgment was endorsed by T.R. Wilcox, “Labour Relations-
Picketing-Illegal Strike-Injunction,” Canadian Bar Review 29 (1951): 531 at 535-36 (“the interests 
of the community demand that the provisions of the statute designed to promote industrial 
peace be exhausted before the parties are free to resort to their own devices”). For a more 
critical view, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The Right to Picket in British Columbia: A Study in 
Statute Interpretation,” University of Toronto Law Journal 9 (1952): 250, 283-87.
 30 [1951] 3 D.L.R. 769.
 31 Earl E. Palmer, “The Short, Unhappy Life of the ‘Aristocratic’ Doctrine,” University of Toronto 
Law Journal 13 (1960): 166.
 32 (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 684.
 33 Henry Bird had been counsel to Pacific Lime Ltd. during a bitterly fought and violent strike 
in Blubber Bay in 1938. The company invoked its common law rights to evict workers from 
company housing and to limit their mobility in a company town. On the strike, see Andrew 
Parnaby, “What’s Law Got to Do with It? The iwa and the Politics of State Power in British 
Columbia, 1935-1939,” Labour/Le Travail 44 (Fall 1999): 9. For a brief discussion of Bird’s role, 
see Stanton, supra note 26 at 19.
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other party) submitted by the employer. According to the majority, none 
of this behaviour was protected under the tua since these activities went 
beyond communicating or persuading by fair or reasonable argument. 
And finally, they distinguished this case from Aristocratic because, in this 
instance, the defendants committed wrongful acts that went beyond the 
fair and reasonable actions of the picketers in the former case.34
 The majority decision in Hammer seemed to signal the unwillingness 
of the bcca to accept the scc’s more liberal view of the scope of lawful 
picketing. Thus, it was somewhat surprising when, two years later, in 
Becker, the next picketing case to reach it, a unanimous panel of the bcca, 
which included O’Halloran and Smith, allowed an appeal and set aside 
an injunction. This was the first time a union won a picketing case in 
the bcca.35 
 The case arose when unionized plumbers who were lawfully locked 
out by their employer responded by peacefully picketing the construction 
site where they had been employed. As a result of the picketing, other 
construction workers on the same site refused to cross. O’Halloran 
accepted that the scc had rejected his view that all picketing was 
intimidation, and he also found no evidence that the picketing at the 
construction site was otherwise wrongful. The picket signs simply stated 
that the workers were locked out, and there was no evidence of a civil 
conspiracy to injure trade. The union’s appeal was successful and the 
injunction was lifted. 
 While Becker indicated the court’s acceptance of that part of the 
scc’s holding in Aristocratic that picketing was not per se wrongful 
intimidation, it remained an open question whether the bcca would 
also embrace the scc’s holding that the failure to comply with the re-
quirements of collective bargaining legislation did not make picketing 
wrongful for that reason alone. The answer came three months later in 
the Therien case,36 which arose when the Teamsters’ union threatened to 
picket the employer unless it complied with the union’s interpretation of 
the collective agreement and terminated its contract with an independent 
contractor, Therien, who was not a member of the union. Despite some 
points of divergence among the three judgments, they agree on one key 
issue: a breach of the labour relations statute constituted the unlawful 
means that made picketing or other collective action tortious under 
 34 Supra note 32 at 702-07.
 35 Becker Construction Co. Ltd. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing 
and Pipe Fitting Industry et al. (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 354.
 36 Therien v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 646 (Davey dissenting 
in part).
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common law. All three judges expressed concern that the threat to picket 
violated the statutory requirement to resolve disputes over the interpre-
tation and application of a collective agreement through arbitration. 
 The case was appealed to the scc, which unanimously upheld the 
bcca. Charles Locke J., who had dissented from the scc’s judgment in 
Aristocratic Restaurant, wrote the main opinion. It is noteworthy that 
Locke, who was appointed to the scc in 1947 directly from his BC law 
practice, had represented lumber companies resisting the International 
Woodworkers’ efforts to organize their employees in the early 1940s, 
arguing that the union was opposed to the war effort.37 In his Therien 
opinion, Locke J. agreed with the bcca that breach of statute could 
constitute the unlawful means requirement of a common law tort. He 
also agreed that the threat to strike violated the arbitration provision 
and, therefore, made the union liable for interfering with another man’s 
method of gaining his living by illegal means.38
 By the end of the second period, the bcca continued to take a very 
narrow view of the scope for lawful picketing. Although the court 
accepted the scc’s rebuke that not all peaceful picketing was either 
criminal watching or besetting or tortious, it was still prone to find 
that the union either had an unlawful purpose or had used unlawful 
means and, thus, had exceeded the narrow limits available for lawful 
picketing. 
INTERPRETING THE FIRST  
LEGISLATIVE PICKETING CODE: 1959-73
In 1959, the BC legislature passed a new trade union act, which codified 
the law of picketing and union liability.39 The legislation was prompted 
by a spate of controversial injunctions that precipitated a study of the 
Trade-Unions Act.40 The new Trade-Unions Act provided a very restrictive 
definition of lawful picketing. Lawful picketing could not involve acts 
that were otherwise unlawful; it could take place only during a legal 
strike or lockout; it was restricted to the employer’s place of business; 
and it was limited to persuading or endeavouring to persuade someone 
 37 Stanton, supra note 26 at 61-67.
 38 International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. v. Therien (1960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1, at 13.
 39 Trade-Unions Act, S.B.C. 1959, c. 90. For a detailed analysis of the statute and its relation 
to previous law, see A.W.R. Carrothers, “The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act, 1959,” 
Canadian Bar Review 38 (1960): 295. For a brief note on the statute published under the same 
title by the same author, see University of Toronto Law Journal 13 (1960): 278.
 40 Carrothers, Labour Injunction. For background on the legislation, see Jamieson, Times of 
Trouble, 374-86.
bc studies64
not to enter into the employer’s place of business, handle the employer’s 
products, or do business with the employer. The 1959 Trade-Unions Act 
also created a statutory right of action against trade unions that violated 
the labour relations statute or picketed illegally. All that the unions 
gained from the legislation was limited immunity against liability for 
civil conspiracies to injure.41 
 The bcca’s approach to labour relations conflict after 1959 was best 
summed up by Mary F. Southin in an article she published in The 
Advocate before she joined the bcca: “While the Court of Appeal may 
no longer think that strikes and picketing are the 8th and 9th deadly 
sins, it nevertheless[,] with all deference[,] still does not understand the 
dynamics of labour disputes.”42 As in the earlier periods, and as Southin 
indicates, the bcca interpreted the law in the manner that most restricted 
the scope for legal picketing, although, once again, strong dissents were 
frequent. 
 The issue of picketing at a site at which employees of other employers 
were employed, known as a common site of employment, arose in the 
first case to reach the bcca in this period, Pacific Coast Terminals.43 The 
longshoremen’s union was on a lawful strike against the BC Shipping 
Federation and placed pickets at the entrances to the docks, which were 
also the entrances to the Pacific Coast Terminal warehouses. Although 
there was no dispute with Pacific Coast Terminal, the union refused to 
issue passes to its unionized employees, and, as a result, they refused to 
cross. The application by Pacific Coast Terminal to prohibit picketing 
at these entrances was granted in the first instance on the basis that 
the object of the union was to interfere with the plaintiff employer’s 
operations to bring pressure on the struck employer. A unanimous bcca 
upheld the decision. 
 The desire to narrowly limit the impact of strikes to the immediate 
parties, even in the context of common site employment, manifested 
itself again in Koss v. Konn et al.,44 in which a representative of the 
carpenters’ union informed a contractor that all of the carpenters on a 
job would have to be union members. When the contractor continued to 
hire non-union carpenters, the defendant appeared outside the job site 
 41 Union members would not be liable for actions that would not be wrongful if committed by 
an individual. The statute also limited the availability of interim injunctions against lawful 
strikes under the labour relations act to situations where they were necessary to safeguard 
the public order or prevent substantial and irreparable injury to property – a provision that 
largely codified the existing common law.
 42 Supra note 4 at 78.
 43 (1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 249.
 44 (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 242.
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with a sign stating that non-union men were working, which resulted in 
some suppliers refusing to deliver material to the construction site. The 
plaintiff obtained an injunction on the basis that the picketing violated 
the 1959 tua. The union appealed on the ground that it was not attempting 
to persuade but merely to provide information and that, to the extent 
the tua prohibited such communication, the legislation was ultra vires 
the province’s jurisdiction since restrictions on freedom of speech were 
a matter of federal jurisdiction. Writing for the majority, Justice Charles 
Tysoe rejected the union’s claim that it was not attempting to persuade. 
He drew an analogy between picketing and torture to make the point 
that persuasion could take place without words: “I am sure the unfortunate 
victims of the rack or the thumbscrew required no words from their 
torturers to make them understand the purpose behind and the results 
expected of the ordeal they were undergoing … I mention these things 
to illustrate the wide significance of the word ‘persuade’ and to show how 
conduct can be as powerful a means of persuasion as words.”45 
 Turning to the activity in question, Tysoe continued: “The defendant 
was not giving out this information in the abstract … He must have 
hoped for some result from his conduct and I think every girl and boy 
of high school age would know his hope, his intention and his purpose 
was to persuade persons not to do any or some of the things set out [in 
the statute].”46 Moreover, according to him, this restriction was properly 
a matter within the provincial power to legislate with respect to property 
and civil rights since its “true object … is … protection of the liberty 
of a person to carry on his legitimate business … and to the use of his 
premises without interference, except when he is an employer who is 
himself involved in a legal strike or a lock-out.”47 
 Justice Thomas Norris disagreed strongly. He noted that a penal statute 
should be constructed narrowly to limit the scope of its prohibitions 
and that there was a legitimate distinction between merely conveying 
information and persuading. On the basis of a narrow interpretation of 
the meaning of persuasion, Norris would have upheld the jurisdiction of 
the province. However, if the limitation on expressive activities was to be 
read more broadly, then he doubted that the province had the authority 
to legislate.48 
 45 Ibid. at 259-60.
 46 Ibid. at 261.
 47 Ibid. at 265.
 48 Ibid. at 243-57.
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 The 1959 statute clearly prohibited secondary picketing (picketing 
other than at the site of the employer’s place of business), and the bcca 
indicated its strong support for this position in Bartle & Gibson, where an 
injunction had been issued to prohibit picketing in front of stores selling 
the struck employer’s products. The union challenged the injunction on a 
variety of technical grounds, but the court would have none of it. Justice 
Tysoe, writing for a unanimous bench, dismissed all three grounds of 
appeal and, in conclusion, stated: “We all know, unfortunately, persons 
who have no interest whatsoever in a labour dispute will insert themselves 
into that dispute and they will cause no end of trouble. The fact that 
there is a restraining order against a union does not seem to affect them. 
They will pay no attention.”49
 The bcca was also called upon to address the legality of primary site 
picketing during a lawful strike on shopping centre property. In Zeller’s 
(Western), the court was faced with an application for an injunction 
from the employer, a tenant in the shopping centre, based on the claim 
that the picketing interfered with access to its premises and therefore 
constituted a nuisance, which made it “otherwise unlawful” and so in 
violation of the 1959 tua. The end result was truly bizarre, reflecting the 
continuing conflict within the bcca over the scope for workers’ collective 
action. In the first round of litigation, the majority opinion, again written 
by Tysoe, and endorsed by Sheppard, took a very restrictive approach, 
suggesting that picketing on a right of way without the consent of the 
owner would almost inevitably constitute a nuisance because it would 
interfere with employees’ and potential customers’ access to the employer’s 
property. Tysoe concluded, “I cannot conceive that any picketing of the 
nature which I suspect the appellant desires to engage in would not 
constitute such unlawful interference. If, however, it would not, the 
restraining order does not stand in the appellant’s way.” 50 Justice John 
Owen Wilson, who it will be recalled as a BC Supreme Court judge 
incurred the displeasure of Justice O’Halloran by attempting to narrow 
O’Halloran’s anti-picketing holding in Hollywood Theatres, dissented. 
In his view, unlike in trespass cases, which involve actual entry onto 
the employer’s property, not every unauthorized entry onto a common 
area of a shopping centre that was used to gain access to the employer’s 
 49 Bartle & Gibson Co. Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 (1971), 18 
D.L.R. (3d) 232 at 238.
 50 Zeller’s (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Food and Drug Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 
581 (hereinafter Zeller’s 1).
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property amounted to a nuisance; rather, he argued, there must be 
proof of injury from the legal picketing, and, since none was offered, 
the injunction ought to have been refused. 
 Despite the clear implication of Tysoe’s judgment, the union decided 
to test the waters and continued to picket peacefully. On the employer’s 
application, the picketers were convicted of contempt for violating the 
injunction. The union appealed and the matter came before a differently 
constituted panel of the bcca, consisting of Justices Sherwood Lett, 
Davey, and Sheppard. This time the court upheld the right of striking 
workers to picket. Writing for the bcca, Davey expressed the view that 
the picketing clearly would have been lawful if conducted on a public 
street. The question, then, was whether otherwise lawful behaviour 
became unlawful when performed on a private easement in the context 
of a shopping centre to which the public was invited. For Davey, the 
answer was clear: “No significant distinction can be drawn in this case 
between picketing on a public sidewalk and on the privately owned 
right of way.”51 Rather than confront the clear difference between this 
view and the earlier view expressed in Zellers 1, Davey squared the circle 
citing the factual differences but did not attempt to identify the legally 
relevant ways in which the picketers’ conduct differed in the two cases. As 
a result, the right of shopping centre tenants to enjoin picketing activity 
on mall property seemed to depend on the luck of the judicial draw. 
Davey, however, raised the possibility that the landlord could base an 
application for an injunction on trespass,52 which was the path followed 
in future shopping-centre picketing litigation and was embraced by the 
scc in Harrison v. Carswell, a case from Manitoba.53
 Five other picketing cases were heard by the bcca in this period, four 
of which went against the union, although in two of the cases that the 
union lost there was a dissent. Two cases were about procedure and cut 
in different directions. In the first, the bcca relaxed the standard an 
employer had to meet regarding presenting a fair question of law and 
 51 Zeller’s (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Food and Drug Clerks Union, Local 1518 (1963), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 
582 at 586 (hereinafter Zeller’s 2).
 52 Ibid. at 586-87.
 53 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200. For a discussion of the Zeller’s decisions, see H.W. Arthurs, “Labour 
Law: Picketing on Shopping Centres,” Canadian Bar Review 43 (1965): 357. The unionization 
drive at Zeller’s was defeated, a fact noted by R.C. Haynes, “The Labour Movement and the 
Injunction in British Columbia,” in BC Federation of Labour Injunction Conference (7 January 
1967, mimeo). On the history of shopping centre picketing and Harrison v. Carswell, see Philip 
Girard and Jim Phillips, “A Certain Malaise: Harrison v. Carswell, Shopping Centre Picketing, 
and the Limits of the Postwar Settlement,” in Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, eds., Work on Trial: 
Cases in Legal Context (Toronto: Irwin and The Osgoode Society, forthcoming 2010).
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establishing irreparable damage as a condition of obtaining an injunction, 
while, in the second, the court dissolved an injunction on the ground 
that the employer failed to meet the onus of proving irreparable loss.54 
In two other judgments, the bcca narrowly interpreted what constituted 
an employer’s place of business and respected corporate divisions within 
a large, functionally integrated enterprise,55 while in a third it strictly 
interpreted the requirement to conduct a strike vote by the affected 
employees.56 Overall, with the exception of Zellers 2 and Goloff, the bcca 
continued its tradition of narrowly interpreting the scope for legal pick-
eting.57 According to Southin, “faced with this social struggle [between 
employers and unions] the Courts have a choice. They can look at the 
words of the legislature and grant injunctions with abandon or they 
can attempt to understand the struggle and to apply existing equitable 
doctrines to these new problems.”58
PRESERVING JUDICIAL POWER UNDER  
THE BC LABOUR CODE: 1973-82
In 1973, the newly elected ndp government enacted the Labour Code of 
British Columbia.59 Although the Code made modest substantive changes 
to the law, it struck a blow to the courts’ historic role of regulating 
picketing through the use of damages and injunctions by conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction on the labour board to deal with these matters, 
except in situations where there was an immediate and serious danger 
to life and health.60 This restriction was a response to the BC Federation 
 54 Flanders Installations Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-450 et al. (1968) 66 
D.L.R. (2d) 438 (Davey dissenting) (injunction upheld); Goloff v. International Woodworkers 
of America Local 1-405 (1959), 29 W.W.R. 511 (injunction dissolved). Southin was very critical 
of the court’s analysis in Flanders. She noted that the court simply failed to appreciate the 
damage that the union suffered when the injunction was issued. See supra note 4, 78-80.
 55 Imperial Oil Limited v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-601 et 
al. (1969), 69 W.W.R. 702; Canada Safeway Limited v. Allied Workers, Local 373, [1974] B.C.J. 
No. 51.
 56 Terra Nova Motor Inn Ltd. v. Beverage Dispensers & Culinary Workers Union, Local 835 et al. 
(1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 693 (Justice Nathan Nemetz dissenting).
 57 Thomas Berger, “The Use of Injunctions in Labour Disputes” (BC Federation of Labour 
Injunction Conference, 7 January 1967, mimeo), argued that the 1959 Act and its interpretation 
drastically curtailed the right to peacefully picket and to disseminate information and that 
it was responsible for the increased use of injunctions in BC labour disputes. 
 58 Supra note 4, 81.
 59 Labour Code of British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122.
 60 The exception to exclusive provincial jurisdiction was subsequently expanded by the ndp 
government to allow courts to act where “a wrongful act or omission … causes an immediate 
danger or serious injury to any individual or causes an actual obstruction or physical damage 
to property.” See S.B.C. 1974-75, c. 33, s. 8. This is the wording of the current exception.
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of Labour’s demand for the elimination of courts’ injunctive powers in 
labour disputes. However, as Professor Harry Arthurs predicted, de-
priving courts of jurisdiction, rather than abolishing common law causes 
of action or immunizing the parties to an industrial dispute from their 
application, left the door open for the courts to assert an ongoing role 
in defining the permissible limits of economic conflict.61 
 Exclusive board jurisdiction over picketing could be limited in two 
ways. First, if the labour conflict was under federal jurisdiction, then the 
provincial Code did not apply and courts could continue to regulate the 
picketing on the basis of the common law. Two of the seven picketing 
cases heard by the bcca during this period successfully challenged 
provincial jurisdiction on this basis.62 The other way for the court to 
maintain its direct involvement in the regulation of industrial conflict 
was to interpret narrowly the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction 
to the labour board. This was the tack taken in two cases. In one the 
bcca held that the Code did not apply to the picketing of provincially 
regulated employers by a federally certified union.63 In the other, it held 
that the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction over picketing did not 
extend to actions brought by third parties who had not been declared 
to be involved in the labour dispute.64 
 Unsurprisingly, every time the bcca found it had jurisdiction, it also 
upheld or granted an injunction.65 In two cases, however, it modified 
terms of the injunction to make it less restrictive. In one case, it limited 
 61 H.W. Arthurs, “‘Dullest Bill’: Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia,” Uni-
versity of British Columbia Law Review 9 (1974): 280 at 301-13.
 62 Western Stevedoring Co. Ltd. et al. v. Pulp Paper & Woodworkers of Canada (1975), 61 D.L.R. 
(3d) 701; Jebsens (U.K.) Ltd. v. Lambert et al. (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 564.
 63 British Columbia Ferry Corp. v. Telecommunications Workers Union et al. (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 
307; affirmed (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 159 (scc).
 64 Better Value Furniture (chwk) Ltd. v. Vancouver Distribution Centre Ltd. et al. (1981) 122 D.L.R. 
(3d) 12. For a critique of this decision and, more generally, of the reassertion of judicial 
jurisdiction in labour disputes, see Ian Donald, “The Return of the Injunction,” in Joseph 
Weiler and Peter Gall, eds., The Labour Code of British Columbia in the 1980s (Calgary and 
Vancouver: Carswell, 1984) 147-58. Donald was subsequently appointed to the BC Supreme 
Court in 1989 and the bcca in 1994.  See below, 73-74.
 65 In Jebsens, the bcca found that: the picketing caused and aimed to cause damage to an in-
nocent third party; there was interference with contractual relations between the plaintiff and 
its employees; there was an arguable case for conspiracy to interrupt contractual relations and 
procure a breach of contract; there were serious and irreparable damages to the plaintiff; and the 
balance of convenience heavily favoured the innocent third party. In Western Stevedoring, the bcca 
granted the injunction on the ground that the picketing interfered with contractual relations, 
although no breach had occurred. In Better Value Furniture, the bcca upheld the injunction on 
the ground that the threat to picket a non-allied employer constituted tortious inducement of 
a breach of contract. On this point, Hutcheon dissented; he interpreted the statute as granting 
unions immunity from actions for interference with contractual relations arising out of lawful 
strikes. In British Columbia Ferry, the court remitted the matter to the lower court. See also 
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the number of pickets to six instead of banning picketing altogether, while 
in the other it prohibited unlawful obstruction instead of limiting the 
number of pickets as the trial judge had done on the basis that the large 
number of pickets was itself a form of intimidation.66 These cases suggest 
that a slightly more liberal attitude towards picketing was gaining some 
traction in the bcca, although, as we shall see, it did not predominate. 
THE CHARTER ERA: 1982-2008
The advent of the Charter raised unions’ hopes that constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression and freedom of association would 
create more scope for trade union activity than was previously allowed. 
However, the bcca did everything it could to dash these hopes. The 
bcca considered picketing less as a form of constitutionally protected 
speech and more as a signal for action. Within the labour context, it 
considered even peaceful consumer leafleting to be coercive. Despite its 
negative view of picketing in Charter cases, of the five cases decided on 
non-Charter grounds, unions won four, more than doubling the labour 
movement’s victories before the bcca.
 In the first Charter challenge to restrictions on picketing to reach 
the bcca, Dolphin Delivery, Justice William Esson, writing for himself 
and Justice John Taggart, rejected the argument that picketing was a 
constitutionally protected expression because the picketing in question 
(even though no picketing had yet occurred) “was not of a kind which 
had as its purpose or object the conveying of information or opinion, or 
of persuading anyone to a point of view, or any purpose or object which 
could reasonably come within the term ‘expression.’”67 In support of this 
conclusion, Esson drew on the work of Paul Weiler, a respected former 
chair of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board and labour law 
scholar, who, in 1980, characterized union members’ response to picket 
lines as “almost Pavlovian,”68 making picketing, in Esson’s view, not 
the kind of rational expressive activity that deserved much in the way 
Holland America Cruises N.V. v. Gralewicz [1975] B.C.J. No. 5, upholding an injunction issued to 
restrain threatened picketing against a cruise ship with a non-union crew.
 66 Muckamuck Restaurant Ltd. v. Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Canada Local No. 1 et 
al. (1979), 14 B.C.L.R. 97; Vancouver Museums and Planetarium Assn. v. Vancouver Municipal 
and Regional Employees’ Union (1981), 27 B.C.L.R. 73. The basis for judicial jurisdiction in these 
cases is not stated and, presumably, was not contested on appeal.
 67 Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 et al. (1984), 10 
D.L.R. (4th) 198, 212. He dismissed the claim that freedom of association protected picketing 
on the ground that the freedom protected the right of individuals to join a union but did not 
protect the purposes of the association or the means that it used to achieve its purposes.
 68 Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) 79.
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of constitutional protection.69 In a concurring judgment, Justice H.E. 
Hutcheon held that all peaceful picketing is constitutionally protected 
expression. However, he upheld the injunction on the basis that the 
limitation of expressive activities that interfered with contractual relations 
was demonstrably justifiable.70 The bcca also rejected the claim that 
freedom of association protected picketing on the ground that freedom 
of association protected the rights of individuals to join associations 
but not the purposes or means used by associations to achieve their 
purposes.71 
 Dolphin was appealed to the scc, where Justice William McIntyre, 
a graduate of the bcca,72 writing for the majority, agreed with Hutcheon 
both that picketing was protected expression and that restrictions placed upon 
it were demonstrably justified. Like Esson, however, McIntryre also quoted 
with approval Weiler’s characterization of picketing’s signal effect.73 
 The next Charter case involved picketing before the court houses of 
the province, and the BC judiciary acted with righteous indignation to 
ensure that unions got the justice the judiciary believed they deserved. 
During a strike by government workers, Chief Justice Allan McEachern, 
of the British Columbia Supreme Court, arrived at work one day to find 
court workers on lawful strike picketing the court house. He issued an 
injunction on his own initiative ordering the union and its members to 
stop picketing at courts across the province and, subsequently, refused 
the union’s application to dissolve the injunction.74 
 On appeal, the bcca, in the first picketing judgment signed by the 
court instead of identifying the author, found it obvious that access to 
the courts would be inhibited by the presence of peaceful picketers, 
despite the fact that there was not a shred of evidence that anyone had 
been deterred from entering the court house. The court also rejected the 
argument that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction on its own 
motion since the Labour Code gave the labour board exclusive jurisdiction 
 69 Supra note 67 at 213. 
 70 Ibid. at 203-05. It has previously been determined by the British Columbia labour board that 
Dolphin Delivery was not an ally of Purolator, the company that was in a labour dispute 
with the union. Therefore, the proposed picketing was viewed by court as tortious because it 
aimed to induce a breach of contract between Dolphin Delivery and Purolator. 
 71 Ibid. at 208.
 72 While on the bcca, McIntyre sat on three picketing cases, Canada Safeway, Western Ste-
vedoring, and Jebsens.  In all three, the bcca unanimously overruled lower court judgments 
refusing to grant an injunction. McIntyre was the author of the Jebsens judgment and wrote 
one of three concurring judgments in Canada Safeway.
 73 Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 et al. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1987), 33 
D.L.R. (4th) 174 (scc).
 74 (1984), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 705.
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over picketing. Citing one of its earlier decisions,75 the bcca held that 
the Code did not oust the jurisdiction of the court to control picketing 
that violated the general and civil law. The picketing in this case was 
clearly in violation of the general law – the law relating to contempt 
of court: “It would be a monstrous situation, indeed, if a citizen were 
forced to delay or lose his Charter rights due to picketing or any other 
interference with his or her access to the courts.”76 The bcca was equally 
dismissive of the claim that the injunction infringed the very Charter 
rights that it was acting to preserve. It had “no doubt that the right of 
access to the courts is under the rule of law one of the foundational pillars 
protecting the rights and freedoms of our citizens”77 and, thus, amply 
justified restricting picketers’ freedom of expression. On appeal, the scc 
affirmed the bcca’s decision and was just as vociferous in denouncing 
court house picketing.78
 The bcca was also dismissive of the claim that the Charter protected 
consumer leafleting in support of a strike. In Kmart, employees on a 
lawful strike at two stores leafleted consumers at two other non-unionized 
Kmart stores. The Industrial Relations Council, the renamed adminis-
trative tribunal administering the Labour Relations Code, restrained the 
leafleting as unlawful picketing. The union challenged the decision on the 
basis that it violated the striking workers’ freedom of expression. Writing 
for a unanimous bcca, Justice D.B. Hinds accepted that the activities in 
question were protected expressive activity but found the restriction was 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The consumer leafleting was equivalent 
to traditional picketing in terms of its purpose and effect, and, as such, 
the analysis of the scc in Dolphin Delivery, which set a low standard 
for justifying the restriction, applied.79 On appeal, a unanimous scc 
reversed the bcca, drawing a very sharp distinction between consumer 
leafleting, which it associated with “informed and rational discourse,” 
and picketing, which, in the court’s view, had a coercive element.80 
 75 Better Value Furniture (chwk), supra note 64.
 76 Re British Columbia Government Employees’ Union and Attorney-General of British Columbia 
et al. (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 399, 404.
 77 Ibid, 406. 
 78 (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1. For a biting and insightful critique, see H.J. Glasbeek, “Contempt 
for Workers,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 28 (1990): 1. 
 79 United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada (1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 119.
 80 U.F.C.W. Local 1518 v. Kmart Canada (1999), 176 D.L.R. (4th) 607, 630 (Cory). In the other 
Charter case, the bcca did not accept the union’s invitation to revisit Harrison v. Carswell 
in light of the Charter. See 281856 B.C. Ltd. v. Kamloops Revelstoke Okanagan Building Trades 
Union et al. (1987), 37 C.C.L.T. 262.
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 During this period, the bcca has also resolved eight non-Charter 
picketing cases based on the law regulating picketing discussed in the 
previous section, and unions were successful in five. Three cases dealt 
with disputes over whether the picketing was federally or provincially 
regulated. In one case, Hecate Logging,81 the bcca upheld a lower court 
decision that the matter fell within federal jurisdiction and affirmed the 
injunction that had been issued; however, in two other cases, it found 
that the dispute came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial 
labour board and therefore dismissed applications for injunctions.82 In 
another case, challenging the scope of the Labour Code’s limitation of 
judicial jurisdiction over picketing, a unanimous court held that statutory 
bar against legal actions in relation to “petty trespass to land to which a 
member of the public ordinarily has access” did not preclude an action for 
trespass. Thus, it was up to the bcca to determine whether the trespass in 
question was petty or not. The effect of this interpretation is that the court 
retains the jurisdiction to determine the nature of the trespass that was 
committed and, hence, whether an action can be brought in court.83
 In its decisions on the scope of lawful picketing, the bcca also seems 
more pluralistic now than in the past. In one case, it upheld an injunction 
requiring pickets to maintain a minimum distance from the employer’s 
premises.84 However, three others, especially two recent decisions 
authored by Justice Ian T. Donald, represent a clearer break with the 
bcca’s traditional hostility to picketing.85 In the first decision, Donald 
started from “the principle that the courts intervene in labour disputes 
as little as possible,”86 a principle to which the bcca had never even paid 
lip service. He also regarded picketing as a legitimate tactic during a 
labour dispute: “[t]he parties are engaged in an economic struggle. The 
Union and its members have only two lawful weapons, the withdrawal 
of labour and picketing. Having exercised their right to picket peacefully, 
they should not have to operate with the sword of contempt over their 
 81 Hecate Logging Ltd. v. I.W.A., Local I-85 (1988), 29 B.C.L.R. (2nd) 318.
 82 A.T.M. Automatic Teller Machines, Services, Ltd. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 213 (1985), 22 
D.L.R. (4th) 282; Maz Tudor Inns Ltd. v. Canadian Assn. of Smelter and Allied Workers (1985), 
24 D.L.R. (4th) 317.
 83 Gateway Casinos LP v. bcgeu, (2007), 67 B.C.L.R (4th) 225.
 84 Rogers Cable T.V. Ltd. v. I.B.E.W., Local 230 (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 535.
 85 The other case, not discussed in detail, is McLean Trucking Co. v. Canadian Freightways Ltd. 
(1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 20, in which the court unanimously dismissed an employer’s appeal from 
a lower court decision refusing an injunction on the grounds that the picketing was lawful. 
 86 Fletcher Challenge Canada Ltd.(MacKenzie Pulp Division) v. C.E.P., Local 1092 (1998), 155 
D.L.R. (4th) 638, 641. In this case, the bcca dissolved an injunction that was granted after 
the plaintiff ’s employee, who was not on strike, did not attempt to cross the union’s picket 
line after being informed that he did not have the union’s permission to do so.
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heads.”87 The two other judges on the panel agreed that the court should 
be especially careful not to go farther than necessary when deciding to 
enjoin picketing during a legal strike.88 
 In the second case, Donald reversed a lower court decision granting an 
injunction against picketing at Prince Rupert grain terminals by a union 
that was locked out by its employer at the Port of Vancouver terminals.89 
In reversing the lower court, Donald held that the judge had erroneously 
relied on the categorical distinction between primary picketing and 
secondary picketing, recently abolished by the scc.90 Moreover, he held 
that the signalling effect of picketing did not make it wrongful.91 
 It remains to be seen whether Donald’s more liberal attitude towards 
picketing becomes the predominant one. As a practitioner, Donald 
frequently appeared as counsel for a variety of unions, including the 
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical, and Allied Workers; 
the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers; and the BC 
Council of Carpenters. He also wrote a critique of the court’s reassertion 
of its power to issue injunctions despite the 1973 Labour Code’s grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction to the labour board.92 But, he is clearly not alone in 
his more pro-labour views since four different judges joined him in the 
two opinions.93 In the context of her decision in a case involving picketing 
before an abortion clinic, Justice Mary Southin’s characterization of the 
bcca’s older labour picketing jurisprudence reflected her earlier opinion, 
written while she was still a practitioner:
 87 Ibid. at 641. 
 88 Ibid. at 645 (Esson); 646 (Hall).
 89 Prince Rupert Grain Ltd. v. Grain Workers’ Union, Local 333 (2002), 8 B.C.L.R. (4th) 91 .
 90 R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Beverages (West) Ltd. (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
 91 Prince Rupert Grain, para. 55. Mackenzie J.A. wrote a brief concurring judgment in which he 
also embraced the wrongful action model but cautioned against unnecessarily saying anything 
that might impede the development of economic torts to protect third-party interests. In a 
subsequent judgment, the bcca rejected an argument based on Pepsi that a conviction for 
contempt arising out of the violation of a labour injunction violated workers’ free speech 
rights. Apart from drawing a distinction between the injunction itself and its breach, the 
court also was of the view that the behaviour in question clearly went beyond the realm of 
protected speech. See Telus Communications Inc. v. Telecommunications Workers Union, 2007 
bcca 413.
 92 Donald, “Return of the Injunction,” supra note 64. 
 93 Justices Esson, Hall, Mackenzie and Smith. Hall, however, was the author of the court’s 
opinion in Gateway Casinos (joined by Smith), which drew a dubious distinction between 
“trespass” and “pretty trespass” to narrow the scope of the labour board’s exclusive jurisdiction 
over picketing. 
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I think it is not unfair or unkind to say that by the 1950’s, the courts 
of British Columbia were thought by some to be anti-labour because 
of the number of injunctions granted in labour disputes … There is 
much to be said for the proposition that [precedents developed during 
the course of labour disputes] should be put permanently away and the 
court should give, in these cases where citizens take to the streets and 
an injunction is sought, a fresh consideration to the extent to which the 
court should go.94
CONCLUSION
In its first hundred years, the bcca considered thirty-eight picketing 
cases. These resulted in eight union victories and two split decisions. 
In twenty-eight cases the union was the appellant, and it lost outright 
70 percent of the time. Employers were the appellants in ten cases and 
won eight, an 80 percent success rate. In some ways, the numbers speak 
for themselves and reflect the strength and consistency of the beliefs of 
a large majority of the bcca judges who sat on such cases that picketing 
was inherently coercive – it had a signalling effect – and that the privilege 
to trade was of significantly greater social value than the privilege of 
workers to act collectively. However, what the numbers do not reveal 
is (1) the internal opposition of a minority of judges, particularly in the 
first sixty years of the court’s history, to the restrictive approach adopted 
by the majority and (2) the signs of a possible shift in recent years. As 
well, the numbers do not reveal the reasons for the bcca’s remarkable 
record, so here we offer some explanations for it. Typically, attempts 
to explain judicial decision making offer some combination of internal 
and external reasons. We can partially account for the bcca’s record 
by pointing to strictures of precedent and traditional common law 
values reflected in precedent, such as individual autonomy, freedom of 
contract, and the fundamental importance of property rights. While 
clearly this is part of the explanation, it fails to account for the fact that 
most bcca judges were generally less willing than were judges in other 
Canadian jurisdictions, including the scc, to acknowledge that workers 
also enjoyed recognized legal privileges to engage in associational 
and expressive activities that advance their legitimate self-interest in 
obtaining improved terms and conditions of employment and that the 
accommodation of those privileges required some limitation on the 
rights that employers claimed. The so-called “taught tradition of the 
 94 R. v. Bridges (1990), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 529 at 541-2. See supra note 4. 
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common law”95 neither dictated nor fully explains the bcca’s consistent 
hostility to picketing.
 So we must also turn to external or contextual factors to explain 
the bcca’s record on picketing. When studying individual decisions 
or judges it is possible to turn to judicial biography to understand how 
the background of a judge affected a judgment. We provided this kind 
of information about a few of the bcca justices who participated in the 
picketing cases, but it is beyond the scope of this article to investigate 
the backgrounds of the more than forty justices involved in the thirty-
seven judgments we discussed, to construct a collective portrait of the 
bcca, or to look at institutional factors such as recruitment processes 
or patterns that may have shaped the court over its one-hundred-year 
history. Indeed, while the articles in this special issue of BC Studies 
contribute towards a better understanding of the bcca, there is not yet a 
book-length history of the court that provides this kind of biographical 
or institutional information.96 That said, in their introduction to this 
special issue, Hamar Foster and John McLaren point to the “corporate 
mindset” that characterized the judges who were appointed to the bcca 
for much of its history, while also acknowledging that, in recent decades, 
there has been greater diversity in the backgrounds of appointees.97 While 
this pattern may not be unique to British Columbia, it provides a partial 
explanation for the pattern of decision making we found.
 We are also of the view that the bcca’s jurisprudence is related to the 
social context of labour relations and features unique to British Columbia. 
Historically, British Columbia has been more densely unionized – as high 
as 51 percent in the 1950s – compared to other provinces. Class relations 
also have been more polarized and turbulent on the west coast than 
they have been elsewhere in Canada. This is because for much of British 
Columbia’s history unions in the province tended to be politically radical 
and organizationally militant, while key employers were closely aligned 
to the provincial government. Moreover, the resource-based economy 
was vulnerable to swings in the world economy, resulting in an unstable 
and conflict-prone labour market.98 In this context, it is not surprising 
 95 Roscoe Pound, “The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Tort,” Harvard Law Review 
53 (1940): 365 at 367.
 96 Histories have been produced for some courts. For example, see Dale Brawn, The Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, 1870-1959: A Biographical History (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2006). And there will soon be a book-length history of the bcca. See Hamar Foster 
and John McLaren, “For the Better Administration of Justice” in this issue at 24. 
 97 Foster and McLaren, ibid. at 16.
 98 British Columbia had larger and longer strikes than the other provinces because of the degree 
of centralization in the key resource sectors (i.e., forestry, mining, and fishing). It also had 
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that the majority of the BC judicial elite would treat with suspicion and 
at times hostility the union tactic – picketing – that most clearly called 
upon class solidarity and that demonstrated the potential for organized 
workers to disrupt not only their immediate employer’s operations but 
also the wider economy.99 
a vibrant socialist party and was the Canadian heartland of the Industrial Workers of the 
World. See Jean Barman, The West beyond the West: A History of British Columbia, 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); Fudge and Tucker, Labour before the Law; Paul 
Phillips, No Power Greater (Vancouver: BC Federation of Labour, Boag Foundation, 1967).
 99 Most picketing cases that reached the bcca, especially in the early years, did not arise from 
strikes in the resource sector but, rather, from urban picketing aimed at persuading consumers 
to refrain from patronizing struck businesses. Perhaps heightened class tensions and more 
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